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What Should the Restatement (Fourth) Say About 
Treaty Interpretation? 
Jean Galbraith* 
ABSTRACT 
The Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) of the 
Foreign Relations Law took notably different approaches to treaty 
interpretation, reflecting intervening changes in the legal landscape. 
This symposium contribution identifies five developments in 
international and domestic law since the Restatement (Third). It then 
considers their import for the forthcoming Restatement (Fourth). Most 
importantly, it argues that the Restatement (Fourth) should fully 
incorporate two articles on treaty interpretation from the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties into its black-letter provisions. Since 
the time of the Restatement (Third), these articles have become central 
to international practice on treaty interpretation, and the principles 
they set forth are broadly consistent with how the U.S. Supreme Court 
approaches treaty interpretation. This contribution also suggests that the 
Restatement (Fourth) soften the Restatement (Third)’s provisions on 
deference to the executive branch in treaty interpretation. Finally, this 
contribution notes the rising importance in foreign relations law of the 
interpretation of legislation related to treaty implementation. 
  
 
* Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. For their helpful comments, I 
thank the participants at the BYU Law Review symposium on Treaty Law and the 
Restatement. I also thank Zach Smith and other editors of the BYU Law Review. A full draft of 
this Article was written (and made publicly available) before the reporters of the Restatement 
(Fourth) circulated their draft provision on treaty interpretation. 
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At the end of the drafting of the Restatement (Third) of the 
Foreign Relations Law, one observer joked that the Restatements 
should be titled like serial westerns—“something like Restatement, 
Return of the Restatement, Son of the Restatement, and the 
Restatement Rides Again.”1 As with all good analogies between law 
and popular culture, this quip is ridiculous and yet somehow right. 
To be sure, there is little of the lone rider in a Restatement. Instead, 
each Restatement is the product of a byzantine institutional process 
involving reporters, counselors, advisers, the ALI Council, and the 
ALI membership, as the immense number of drafts will attest. But 
the quip has a ring of truth. There is something undeniably heroic 
about the Restatements. They tower over most other private 
contributions to the understanding and the development of law. 
With the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law now 
on horse—though still far from the sunset—comes the scramble to 
influence its course. Like others, I have a wish list. Mine includes as 
narrow treatment as possible of some recent Supreme Court 
decisions relating to treaties and an emphasis on process-based 
flexibility for the political branches.2 For purposes of this symposium, 
however, I wish to focus on a single issue: the legal principles that 
should govern the interpretation of treaties by U.S. courts. 
Two core questions underlie treaty interpretation by U.S. courts. 
First, what legal principles govern the interpretation of treaties? 
Second, to what actors, if any, should deference be given with regard 
to treaty interpretation? Each of these questions potentially has both 
international and domestic legal dimensions. The Restatement 
(Second) and Restatement (Third) both addressed these questions, 
 
 1.  The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Revised: How Were 
the Controversies Resolved?, 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 180, 181 (1987) (remarks of 
Professor Harold G. Maier). I have reluctantly decided not to adopt this naming convention. 
Instead, I follow the American Law Institute in referring to the 1965 Restatement of the 
Foreign Relations Law as Restatement (Second) and to the 1987 Restatement of the Foreign 
Relations Law as Restatement (Third)—a naming schema used despite the fact that there was 
never a Restatement (First) of the Foreign Relations Law. 
 2.  See Jean Galbraith, Congress’s Treaty-Implementing Power in Historical Practice, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 59 (2014) (demonstrating that long-standing historical practice 
supports a congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement treaties); 
Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 247 (2012) (arguing that 
under certain conditions the Senate has the constitutional power to advise and consent to 
treaties before they are finalized). 
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but, as I detail here, they did so against quite different backdrops 
than are present today. Since the Restatement (Third) was finalized 
in the mid-1980s, there have been shifts both in international law on 
treaty interpretation and in U.S. domestic practice regarding treaty 
interpretation. The Restatement (Fourth) should ideally structure its 
provisions on treaty interpretation not only to reflect these 
developments, but also to situate them analytically in ways that 
further the “clarification and simplification of the law and its better 
adaptation to social needs.”3 I argue here that the most important 
way to do so would be to incorporate the full text of Articles 31 and 
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna 
Convention”) into the black letter of Restatement (Fourth). In 
addition, I offer some thoughts on how the Restatement (Fourth) 
should approach the issues of deference and of the interpretation of 
statutes related to the implementation of treaties. 
I. HOW THE RESTATEMENTS (SECOND) AND (THIRD) DEALT WITH 
TREATY INTERPRETATION 
This Part describes the choices about treaty interpretation made 
in the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) and sets them 
in the context of the times in which these Restatements were drafted. 
Doing so sets the stage for considering the prospects for change and 
continuity in the future Restatement (Fourth). 
A. Restatement (Second) 
The original plan of study for the Restatement (Second) did not 
include treaty interpretation among its topics.4 It was quickly added, 
but mainly because of an interest in the domestic legal question of 
whether U.S. courts owed deference to the views of the executive 
 
 3.  Certificate of Incorporation of the American Law Institute (Feb. 23, 1923), 
https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public/10/62/106284da-ddfe-4ff4-a698-0a47f268ee4c/ 
certificate-of-incorporation.pdf. Throughout this piece, I focus on U.S. courts as the 
interpretive actors, but some of the analysis could also apply to executive branch actors 
engaged in treaty making. 
 4.  Am. Law Inst., Agenda for Discussion of Possible Work on Project in the Field of 
Foreign Relations Law 3–5 (Mar. 1955) (describing four sub-issues for the planned treaty 
section, none of which was interpretation). All primary sources cited from the drafting of the 
Restatements, including this document, are available on Hein’s ALI database. 
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branch.5 By contrast, Reporter Adrian Fisher initially considered the 
international law on treaty interpretation to be a topic on which the 
Restatement would not add particular value. 6  As the project 
developed, however, it came to encompass both international and 
domestic legal considerations in relation to treaty interpretation. 
As to the international legal principles of treaty interpretation, 
Section 147(1) of the Restatement (Second) identified the overall aim 
to be “ascertain[ing] and giv[ing] effect to the purpose of the 
international agreement.”7 It produced a list of nine factors “to be 
taken [into] account by way of guidance” in doing so.8 The first 
factor was “the ordinary meaning of the words of the agreement in 
the context in which they are used,” while the remaining eight 
factors included the shared negotiating history, subsequent practice, 
and other textual and background considerations.9 Section 147(2) 
then provided that while the first factor “must always be considered 
as a factor in the interpretation of [an] agreement,” there was “no 
established priority as between the [other factors] . . . or as between 
them and additional factors not listed therein.”10 
The Restatement (Second) identified two additional domestic-law 
factors that U.S. courts interpreting a treaty should use “for the 
purpose of determining its effect as domestic law.”11 The first was 
relevant evidence from the U.S. negotiators and from the advice-
and-consent process, regardless of whether this material was 
communicated to other parties to the treaty.12 The second factor was 
the giving of “weight”—in fact “great weight”—to an interpretation 
asserted by the executive branch “in the conduct of [U.S.] foreign 
 
 5.  Am. Law Inst., Project for Work in the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
37–38 (1955). 
 6.  Am. Law Inst., Transcript of Conference on Possible Project in Foreign Relations Law 20 
(Mar. 31, 1955) (explaining that while some international legal issues, such as reservations, were 
the “part of the wheel that seems to . . . be squeaking” and thus deserved treatment, treaty 
interpretation seemed straightforward and its coverage would be “awfully black-letter-ish”). 
 7.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 147(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. § 147(2). 
 11.  Id. § 151. 
 12.  Id. § 151(a) & cmt. b. 
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relations.”13 Commentary in a preliminary draft asked “[h]ow [m]uch 
[w]eight [d]oes ‘[g]reat [w]eight’ [h]ave?” and observed bluntly that 
“[t]horough-going realists might say that in actuality the ‘great 
weight’ rule is merely a symbol of professional courtesy between 
coordinate branches of government, or that it is a rationalization of 
conclusions reached on other grounds.”14 The final commentary was 
not so explicit, but it did remark that “the relative importance of the 
weight to be accorded to the views of the executive branch and the 
factors indicated in § 147 cannot be precisely stated.”15 
Several things are notable about the approach adopted by the 
Restatement (Second). First, overall there is a strong preference for 
flexibility over predictability in treaty interpretation. The invocation 
of nine factors in Section 147 is the most obvious expression of this 
preference, but it can also be found in the comment suggesting the 
variable meaning of “great weight.” Second, the only institutional 
deference identified—the deference due to the positions of the 
executive branch—is to a domestic actor. The Restatement (Second) 
is mostly silent about the prospect of deference to foreign or 
international courts. As to foreign courts, the commentary 
effectively treats their interpretations as an uninteresting species of 
state practice, viewing their decisions as “no more conclusive 
internationally than any other unilateral national interpretation such 
as one by a foreign office or chief of state.”16 As to international 
courts, the Restatement (Second) notes that their interpretations can 
bind internationally for a state that has previously consented to their 
jurisdiction, but does not suggest deference in other circumstances.17 
Third, the Restatement (Second) treats evidence of the U.S. intent in 
forming the treaty and deference to the executive branch’s 
interpretation as important for U.S. courts engaged in treaty 
interpretation because of treaties’ status as domestic law. By 
conceptually separating the treaty’s status as international law from 
 
 13.  Id. §§ 149, 151(b), 152. 
 14.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 4.08 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 1959). 
 15.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 152 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 16.  Id. § 148 cmt. b. 
 17.  Id. § 148(1). 
2.GALBRAITH.AA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2016  5:37 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
1504 
the treaty’s status as domestic law, the Restatement (Second) thus 
justifies parochial moves that can further U.S. functional and 
institutional values. But in the process it creates the odd potential of 
a treaty provision having one meaning under international law and a 
different meaning under domestic law. In the commentary, the 
authors of the Restatement (Second) signal consciousness about the 
awkwardness of their solution by noting that, in practice, courts and 
agencies try to “avoid differences between the international and the 
internal legal effects of international agreements.”18 
The Restatement (Second) was published in 1965. Just four years 
later, the Vienna Convention was finalized.19 During its negotiations, 
the United States pushed hard for highly flexible clauses on treaty 
interpretation, but the Vienna Convention ultimately adopted a 
somewhat more focused approach.20 Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention provides that a treaty “shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”21 
Among other additional provisions, it also states that there “shall be 
taken into account . . . [a]ny subsequent agreement between the 
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty [and] [a]ny 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”22 Article 
32 provides that “[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the 
meaning where the interpretation according to Article 31” is 
ambiguous or manifestly absurd.23 Taken together, Articles 31 and 
32 cover much of the same ground as Section 147 of the 
Restatement (Second), but they are not as free form. Among other 
 
 18.  Id. § 151 cmt. a. 
 19.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 20.  Julian Davis Mortenson, The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to 
Drafting History?, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 780, 798–820 (2013) (providing a detailed account of 
the negotiating history of Articles 31 and 32). 
 21.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 19, at 340. 
 22.  Id. Another provision of Article 31 notes that “[a]ny relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties” should also be considered. Id. 
 23.  Id. 
2.GALBRAITH.AA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2016  5:37 PM 
1499 What Should the Restatement (Fourth) Say? 
 1505 
differences, they place a stronger emphasis on the treaty’s text and a 
lesser weight on the negotiating history. 
The United States signed the Vienna Convention in 1970. 
Because of a disagreement between the president and the Senate 
about an issue unrelated to Articles 31 and 32, the United States did 
not ratify the treaty in the years that followed its signature.24 To this 
day, the treaty remains formally pending in the Senate’s advice and 
consent process.25 
B. Restatement (Third) 
The authors of the Restatement (Third) wrote their sections on 
treaty interpretation against the backdrop of both the Restatement 
(Second) and the Vienna Convention. One major choice for them, 
therefore, was what to do when the two differed. Which should 
they follow? 
The first tentative draft forthrightly sided with the Vienna 
Convention over Section 147 of the Restatement (Second) in its 
proposed black-letter language. These proposed sections tracked 
Vienna Convention Articles 31 and 32 word-for-word, except for 
substituting the term “international agreement” for “treaty.”26 The 
draft commentary and reporters’ notes stated that the Vienna 
Convention’s provisions were “somewhat different from the 
approach ordinarily taken by courts in the United States” in that the 
Vienna Convention placed more emphasis on text, and less on 
purpose and on the drafting history.27 This draft also concluded that 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention were too specific to 
embody customary international law and observed that therefore, 
since the United States had not ratified the Vienna Convention, 
these articles “do not strictly govern interpretation by the United 
States or by courts in the United States.”28 Yet the tentative draft 
 
 24.  Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United 
States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 295–99 (1988) (describing this issue in depth). 
 25.  Treaties Pending in the Senate, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Apr. 27, 2015), 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/pending/. 
 26.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§§ 329–330 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 1980). 
 27.  Id. § 329 cmt. b. 
 28.  Id. § 329 cmt. a. 
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nonetheless decided to throw its lot in with the Vienna Convention 
in describing the international legal principles, while retaining 
additional sections on principles relevant for U.S. courts as they 
interpret treaties as domestic law.29 
By contrast, the final draft opted for muddy waters. The black-
letter provision on interpretation under international law—Section 
325—offered only a partial endorsement of Vienna Convention 
Article 31. It followed Article 31 in noting that interpretation should 
be “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to [an international agreement’s] terms in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose.”30 It then had a provision on 
subsequent agreement and subsequent practice, but this provision 
differed from Article 31 by indicating that subsequent practice was 
relevant even if this practice did not establish the agreement of the 
parties.31 The black-letter provision did not include other parts of 
Article 31 and made no reference to Article 32. 
The comments and reporters’ notes revealed that fierce debates 
lay beneath this black-letter brevity. Like the tentative draft, a 
comment in the final draft concluded that the Vienna Convention’s 
specific rules on treaty interpretation did not embody customary 
international law and therefore did not currently bind U.S. courts.32 
The remaining comments and reporters’ notes then emphasized 
ways in which U.S. practice differed from the Vienna Convention’s 
approach.33 These included that U.S. courts placed greater emphasis 
on the negotiating history, that U.S. courts were more purposive in 
 
 29.  See id. §§ 334–335. 
 30.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 325(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 31.  Id. § 325(2); see also id. § 325 cmt. c. 
 32.  Id. § 325 cmt. a. 
 33.  The comments also observed that different interpretive approaches might be 
appropriate for different types of treaties. Articles 31 and 32 do not say anything about this 
explicitly but commentators have since read them to be compatible with this position. See, e.g., 
Catherine Brolmann, Specialized Rules of Treaty Interpretation: International Organizations, in 
THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 507, 508–09 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012); Richard 
Gardiner, The Vienna Convention Rules on Treaty Interpretation, in THE OXFORD GUIDE 
TO TREATIES, supra, at 475, 504; Mark E. Villiger, The Rules on Interpretation: Misgivings, 
Misunderstandings, Miscarriage? The ‘Crucible’ Intended by the International Law 
Commission, in THE LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION 105, 122 
(Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011). 
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approach, and that overall U.S. courts were “generally more willing 
than those of other states to look outside the instrument to 
determine its meaning.”34 In other words, the comments and notes 
reiterated many of the positions taken by the United States during 
the negotiation of the Vienna Convention. Taken all together, the 
end result is one of studied ambiguity: one can find support in 
Section 325 either for following the Vienna Convention or for 
continuing the more free-form approach endorsed by the 
Restatement (Second).35 
The Restatement (Third) mostly followed the Restatement 
(Second) in concluding that U.S. courts should take into account 
U.S. negotiating records and materials from the advice-and-consent 
process and that U.S. courts should give “great weight” to executive 
branch interpretations.36 But there are some differences between the 
Restatement (Second) and its successor. For example, the obligation 
to take U.S. materials into special account was moved out of the 
black-letter provisions, the “great weight” accorded to the president 
is suggested to be strongest where the president’s interpretation is 
made in communication with other countries, and the linkage 
between these interpretive positions is tied not to a treaty’s status as 
“domestic law” but rather to its status as “law in the United 
States.”37 But it is hard to tell if these differences were meant to be 
meaningful substantive changes. The Restatement (Third) also 
followed the Restatement (Second) in saying nothing particular about 
deference to interpretive decisions by foreign courts, save for a line 
in the reporters’ notes that “the interpretation of the agreement by 
other nations, or by international tribunals in cases to which the 
United States is not a party, will be given due weight.”38 
 
 34.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 325 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also id. § 325 cmt. e & nn.1 & 4. One can 
debate how accurately these assertions reflected U.S. case law at the time, but I do not 
undertake that inquiry here. 
 35.  Cf. John Parry, The Political Theory of Treaties in the Restatements of Foreign 
Relations Law, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1581, 1618–19 (2016) (finding continuity between the 
Restatement (Second)’s and the Restatement (Third)’s approaches to treaty interpretation). 
 36.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 326(2) & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also id. § 325 reporters’ note 5. 
 37.  See generally id. §§ 325–326. 
 38.  Id. § 325 reporters’ note 4 (adding that “such ‘foreign’ interpretations ordinarily 
are not binding on the United States as a matter of international law and are therefore not 
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II. CHANGES SINCE THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
Both the international and the domestic legal landscapes on 
treaty interpretation have changed in important ways since the 
Restatement (Third). This Part briefly describes five changes that I 
see as important for purposes of evaluating what the Restatement 
(Fourth) should say on treaty interpretation. I focus on describing 
the changes that have developed rather than on assessing their 
normative desirability. 
First, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention are now 
accepted as customary international law, even as the status of 
customary international law as part of the law of the United States has 
become more controversial. As noted, the Restatement (Third) did not 
consider Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention to embody 
customary international law. Today, however, there is a strong 
consensus that Articles 31 and 32 do stand for customary 
international law on treaty interpretation. 39  Indeed, the United 
States takes this position in litigation before the International Court 
of Justice.40 Accordingly, it seems safe to treat Articles 31 and 32 as 
applicable to the United States as a matter of customary 
international law. 
Yet in the years since the Restatement (Third), the status of 
customary international law as federal law in the United States has 
become more controversial. Scholars have taken a range of positions 
on the issue and, at present, there is no clear consensus. 41 
 
binding on United States courts”). The notes further observed that “The United States and its 
courts and agencies, however, are bound by an interpretation of an agreement of the United 
States by an international body authorized by the agreement to interpret it.” Id. 
 39.  For discussion of this issue, see RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 
12–19 (2008). See also Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. 
Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 445–48 (2004) (collecting sources with a special 
emphasis on U.S. courts). 
 40.  Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 67–68 & n.142 (Nov. 3, 2003), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
files/128/10837.pdf (describing Article 31 as “an article reflecting customary international 
law” and observing of Article 32 that “[t]his provision of the [Vienna Convention] likewise 
reflects customary international law”). 
 41.  Some of the many articles in this debate include Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern 
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About 
Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. 
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Fortunately, this overall lack of clarity is mitigated on the particular 
issue of treaty interpretation. Regardless of the extent to which 
customary international law is part of federal law, there are good 
reasons for federal courts to draw on shared international principles 
in treaty interpretation. As the Supreme Court observed in a recent 
case, “[i]t is our responsibility to read the treaty in a manner 
consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties.”42 
Using the accepted international rules on treaty interpretation would 
further the dispatch of this responsibility. In addition, given the 
executive branch’s acceptance of Vienna Convention provisions like 
Articles 31 and 32 as customary international law, “[p]erhaps not 
surprisingly, therefore, courts sometimes invoke the [customary 
international law] of [treaties] as embodied in the 
Vienna Convention.”43 
Second, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have proved 
more malleable in international legal practice than their language 
might suggest. The final draft of the Restatement (Third) was 
published in 1987, eighteen years after the drafting of the Vienna 
Convention and only seven years after it entered into force. Since 
that time, Articles 31 and 32 have mellowed with age. As Richard 
Gardiner has put it, practice “reveal[s] a quite loose structure for 
developing interpretations, rather than a straightjacket or formulaic 
set of requirements.”44 This flexibility is also emphasized in the work 
of international bodies and individual scholars. As one example, the 
International Law Commission’s current project on Treaties Over 
Time defines subsequent practice as meaningful under the Vienna 
 
REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as 
Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is 
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); David H. Moore, An 
Emerging Uniformity for International Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2006); Curtis A. 
Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the 
Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007); Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford 
R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2009); Carlos M. Vázquez, 
Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions 
and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495 (2011). 
 42.  Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1233 (2014) (emphasis, citation, and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43.  CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 160 
(2013) (footnote and citation omitted). 
 44.  Gardiner, supra note 33, at 492. 
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Convention’s rules on interpretation even when this practice falls 
short of clear agreement.45 As another example, Julian Mortenson 
has argued that the Vienna Convention is in fact fairly generous in 
the extent to which it allows the drafting history to be used.46 The 
authors of the Restatement, however, read the Vienna Convention 
narrowly on each of these issues and accordingly resisted its 
authority.47 Now that there is more support for reading Articles 31 
and 32 broadly, concerns about their constraints should be reduced. 
Third, U.S. courts now approach treaty interpretation in ways that 
seem compatible with Articles 31 and 32. The last thirty years have 
also brought developments in treaty interpretation in U.S. courts. 
For better or worse, there has been a turn towards textualism in U.S. 
statutory interpretation, eroding what the reporters of the 
Restatement (Third) viewed as “the strong tendency in United States 
case law to reject literal-minded interpretation of statutes.”48 This 
same turn has manifested itself in treaty interpretation. A 1988 
Supreme Court decision explained that “[w]hen interpreting a 
treaty, we begin with the text of the treaty and the context in which 
the written words are used.”49 The Court immediately qualified this 
 
 45.  The International Law Commission’s current draft conclusions do this in two ways. 
First, they do so in relation to Article 31(3), which speaks of “[a]ny subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 19, at 340. The draft 
conclusions make clear that such agreement can be satisfied by active engagement by a varying 
number of parties combined with “[s]ilence on the part of one or more parties . . . when the 
circumstances call for some reaction.” Int’l Law Comm’n, Subsequent Agreements and 
Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.833, 
at Draft Conclusion 9 (2014), http://legal.un.org/ docs/? symbol= A/ CN.4/ L.833. Second, 
the draft conclusions find that subsequent practice by a single party is a supplementary means 
of interpretation for purposes of Article 32. Int’l Law Comm’n, Subsequent Agreements and 
Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.813, 
at Draft Conclusion 1(4) (2013), http://legal.un.org/ docs/? symbol= A/ CN.4/ L.813 
(“Recourse may be had to other subsequent practice in the application of the treaty as a 
supplementary means of interpretation under article 32.”); id. at Draft Conclusion 4(3) (observing 
that “[o]ther subsequent practice” can be the conduct of “one or more parties” to the treaty). 
 46.  See generally Mortenson, supra note 20. 
 47.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 325 cmts. c, e, g, & reporters’ note 4. 
 48.  Id. § 325 reporters’ note 4. 
 49.  Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991) (using 
this same language). 
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remark, however, by noting that “[o]ther general rules of 
construction may be brought to bear on difficult or ambiguous 
passages” and “[t]reaties are construed more liberally than private 
agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the 
written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the 
practical construction adopted by the parties.”50 More recently, in 
Abbott v. Abbott, the Supreme Court simply stated that “[t]he 
interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins 
with its text.”51 It is hard to tell how much this proclaimed emphasis 
on text affects the actual interpretive process engaged in by the 
Court. Abbott itself drew upon many interpretive principles besides 
text, including subsequent practice, evidence from the negotiations, 
and the “objects and purposes” of the treaty.52 And another more 
recent case, Bond v. United States, downplayed text in favor of the 
perceived purpose of the treaty at issue.53 
The overall picture is essentially one of convergence between 
Articles 31 and 32 as interpreted over time and the Supreme Court’s 
approach to treaty interpretation. Both emphasize text but make 
room for many other interpretive principles as well. As one scholar 
puts it, “at one time or another the Court has used every single 
interpretive tool reflected in the Vienna Rules” and indeed 
“consistently relies on the same interpretive tools.”54 This similarity 
is likely one rooted in the common imperatives of engaging in 
 
 50.  Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 486 U.S. at 700 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 51.  560 U.S. 1, 9 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Medellín v. Texas, 
552 U.S. 491, 506–07 (2008) (using this same language but also noting that “we have also 
considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as 
the postratification understanding of signatory nations”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 52.  560 U.S. at 18–20 (not stating, however, how much weight it was giving the 
evidence from the negotiating history, perhaps because of doubts about how objectively this 
evidence reflected the negotiating history); see also infra note 63 and accompanying text 
(noting Abbott’s use of deference to the executive branch). 
 53.  134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014) (discussing the interpretation of the treaty in the 
course of interpreting its implementing legislation, stating that despite “its broadly worded 
definitions, we have doubts that a treaty about chemical weapons has anything to do with” an 
individual assault that used chemicals and adding that there “is no reason to think the 
sovereign nations that ratified the Convention were interested in anything like” such 
individual assaults). 
 54.  Roger P. Alford, Bond and the Vienna Rules, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1561 
(2015); see also id. at 1566–70. 
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interpretation rather than in direct causal ties. The Supreme Court 
has paid little formal attention to Articles 31 and 32—or, for that 
matter, to either Restatement with regard to treaty interpretation. To 
date, no Supreme Court majority opinion has cited the Vienna 
Convention Articles 31 or 32, and only two dissenting opinions have 
done so.55 One Supreme Court majority opinion does cite Section 
325 of the Restatement (Third) for the proposition that “[a]n 
international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”56 The Court 
does not mention that this language is modeled off Article 31, but 
the use of this language demonstrates that the Court is indeed 
comfortable with the rule articulated in Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention. This is consistent with the broader point that while the 
Supreme Court shows no specific attachment to the Vienna 
Convention’s provisions on treaty interpretation, it also shows no 
particular hostility toward them. Instead, the Court mostly just 
quotes its own precedent on the standards of interpretation which, as 
mentioned, seems within the big tent of Articles 31 and 32. 
Although the general principles of treaty interpretation have 
converged, there remains the issue of how U.S. courts should deal 
with what the Restatement (Second) identified as domestic-law 
factors: first, deference to the executive branch and second, the 
 
 55.  Abbott, 560 U.S. at 40 n.11 (2010) (Stevens, Thomas & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) 
(citing Article 32 of the Vienna Convention in arguing that the focus should have been on the 
plain language); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 191, 194 (1993) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Articles 31 and 32 in chiding the majority for over-
emphasizing dubious evidence from the negotiating history at the expense of the ordinary 
meaning of the text). Some lower court opinions do cite to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention. See Criddle, supra note 39, at 447 n.72 (giving examples). 
 56.  Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006). In addition, one majority 
opinion of the Court has cited to Section 147 of the Restatement (Second). Trans World 
Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 259 (1984) (citing in passing to the 
Restatement (Second)’s inclusion of subsequent practice as a factor in treaty interpretation). As 
best I can tell, Restatement provisions on treaty interpretations have been cited in only one 
other case—in a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia. In this opinion, he attacks the position 
taken in both the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement (Third) that U.S. courts can draw 
on materials from the Senate advice and consent process in interpreting treaties, at least where 
the text appears plain. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371–76 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (stating that this approach “commits the United States to a form of interpretation 
plainly out of step with international practice”). 
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added importance of U.S. intent in forming the treaty as shown by 
U.S. negotiating documents and evidence from the advice-and-
consent process. I address the first point as a separate issue below.57 
As for the second point, my impression is that this issue has not 
proved particularly important in practice, at least outside the context 
of treaty self-execution, which I discuss as a separate issue below.58 
This may be because in practice evidence specific to internal U.S. 
processes may rarely end up shedding light on contested issues of 
treaty interpretation before U.S. courts. In United States v. Stuart, 
for example, the Court did discuss this evidence but only for the 
purpose of observing that it shed no light on the specific issue in the 
case. 59  The importance of this issue may be further diminished 
because, as discussed below,60 the domestic law that courts are directly 
applying is often treaty-implementing legislation rather than treaties. 
Fourth, the picture with respect to deference reflects some modest 
changes since the Restatement (Third). Current doctrine with respect 
to deference to the executive branch is hard to characterize with 
confidence. In an important survey of the issue, Robert Chesney 
suggests that “the high-water mark for the deference doctrine in its 
formal aspect” came with the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in 
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc v. Avagliano61—a few years before the 
Restatement (Third) was completed. Yet the Supreme Court and 
lower courts do frequently continue to invoke the principle of 
deference and, when they do so, they usually interpret the treaty in 
line with the executive branch’s position (although it is hard to know 
how causal the executive branch position is to the outcome).62 In 
Abbott v. Abbott, for example, the Court invoked the “great weight” 
doctrine over the dissenting view of Justices Stevens, Thomas, and 
 
 57.  See infra Section III.B. 
 58.  See infra Section III.C. 
 59.  489 U.S. at 366–67. As noted supra note 56, Justice Scalia objected to this 
interpretive consideration. 
 60.  See infra Section III.C. 
 61.  Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive 
Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1749 (2007). 
 62.  See id. at 1754–58 (reviewing published federal court decisions from 1984 to 2007 
that invoke the concept of deference and finding that the executive branch position usually 
prevails in these cases, but noting that he only reviewed cases “in which the courts engaged, 
more or less directly, the deference doctrine”). 
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Breyer that the doctrine was inappropriate where the executive 
branch had “no unique vantage” on the issue.63 But in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld the Supreme Court declined to even mention the “great 
weight” standard as it ruled against the executive branch on a point 
of treaty interpretation, even as Justice Thomas chided it in a dissent 
joined by Justice Scalia for not “acknowledging its duty to defer to 
the President.”64 More recently, in BG Group PLC v. Republic of 
Argentina, the Court simply said that “we respect the Government’s 
views about the proper interpretation of treaties” and then 
disregarded those views.65 In short, although the “great weight” 
standard continues to be frequently invoked, one cannot confidently 
predict that a court will in fact give great weight to the views of the 
executive branch on treaty interpretation.66 
Besides deference to the executive branch, the Supreme Court 
sometimes notes deference to treaty interpretations by foreign 
courts. As mentioned earlier, both the Restatement (Second) and the 
Restatement (Third) appear to view foreign court decisions as 
relevant only as state subsequent practice (unless they are directly 
binding decisions by international tribunals). The Supreme Court 
has indeed embraced foreign court decisions as evidence of state 
practice. In Abbott v. Abbott, the Court observed that in 
“interpreting any treaty, the opinions of our sister signatories are 
entitled to considerable weight”67 and then went on at some length 
to discuss court decisions in other jurisdictions.68 Something notable 
about Abbott—and about other cases in which the Court has looked 
to the practice of other states—is how much the Court focuses on 
the decisions of individual foreign courts as distinct from statements 
 
 63.  560 U.S. 1, 15 (2010); see also id. at 41–43 (Stevens, Thomas & Breyer, 
JJ., dissenting). 
 64.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 619–32 (2006); see also id. at 718–19 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 65.  134 S. Ct. 1198, 1209 (2014). 
 66.  Harlan Grant Cohen, The Death of Deference and the Domestication of Treaty Law, 
2015 BYU L. REV. 1467, 1471–83 (2016) (discussing the deference trends of the Supreme 
Court in more detail). 
 67.  Abbott, 560 U.S. at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted) (using this broad 
language even though, in addition, the accompanying statute emphasized the importance of 
uniformity in interpretation). 
 68.  Id. at 16–18. 
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or positions taken by individual legislative or executive branches.69 At 
the least, foreign court decisions appear to be the favored markers of 
state practice for the Supreme Court; at the most, one could say that 
there seems to be a level of deference that at least sometimes 
transcends the category of state practice. In addition, the Supreme 
Court has expressed a willingness, albeit a distinctly lukewarm one, 
to give “respectful consideration to the interpretation of an 
international treaty rendered by an international court with 
jurisdiction to interpret such.”70 Taken all together, the Court seems 
to place special emphasis on the appropriateness of looking to 
foreign court decisions in treaty interpretation. 
Finally, U.S. practice on treaty implementation has developed in 
ways that are relevant to treaty interpretation. Since the time of the 
Restatement (Third), issues involving treaty implementation in the 
United States have received considerable attention. Two issues in 
particular relate to treaty interpretation. 
One issue has to do with whether or not a treaty is self-
executing.  According to Medellín v. Texas, whether a treaty is self-
executing in the United States is primarily a matter of treaty 
interpretation.71 Yet there is an important disconnect between this 
 
 69.  Id.; Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1233 (2014) (noting foreign 
court decisions in interpreting the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of Child Abduction, 
although without expressly discussing the level of weight given to them); El Al Israel Airlines, 
Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 173–76 & n.16 (1999) (heavily emphasizing a 
decision from the highest court of England and Wales under the Warsaw Convention and 
noting other foreign cases as well); E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 550–51 (1991) 
(giving weight to an Israeli Supreme Court decision regarding the Warsaw Convention but 
concluding that this weight was outweighed by factors favoring a different interpretation); see 
also Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1238–39 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that not only is the 
executive branch’s position “entitled to great weight,” but “[s]o, too, is the interpretation of 
the courts of our sister signatories” and discussing several foreign decisions); Olympic Airways 
v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should 
have interpreted the Warsaw Convention differently in light of appellate court decisions in two 
of the many signatories to the Warsaw Convention). 
 70.  Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam). Compare Sanchez-Llamas 
v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 334 (2006) (reiterating this standard but noting that it “cannot 
overcome the plain import” of the treaty provision at issue), with id. at 382–90 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the majority was far too stingy in how it applied 
“respectful consideration”). 
 71.  552 U.S. 491, 506–07 (2008). But see id. at 541 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that prior Supreme Court precedent on self-execution is more important than a treaty’s 
particular text on this issue). 
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matter of treaty interpretation and most matters of treaty 
interpretation. Unlike typical treaty interpretation, the question of 
self-execution or non-self-execution is ultimately a matter only of 
U.S. domestic law, not also of international law.72 Although Medellín 
describes principles of treaty interpretation using language from prior 
cases engaged in typical treaty interpretation,73 the Court approaches 
the issue of whether the relevant article of the U.N. Charter is self-
executing in ways that show the distinctness of this issue. Most 
notably, it emphasizes background principles of foreign relations law 
and how, in its view, these would have affected the way the Senate 
perceived the treaty in giving its advice and consent.74 In practice 
then, as well as conceptually, the issue of self-execution is not on all 
fours with typical treaty interpretation. 
The other issue has to do with the increased prominence of 
statutes related to the implementation of treaties. John Coyle has 
coined the phrase “incorporative statutes” to describe statutes that 
implement non-self-executing treaties, facilitate the implementation 
of self-executing treaties, or approve and implement congressional-
executive agreements.75 These kinds of statutes have long existed,76 
but in recent years they have increasingly become the focus of 
specific consideration by the Supreme Court.77 In the last few years, 
for example, the Court decided Abbott v. Abbott78 and Lozano v. 
Montoya Alvarez, 79 interpreting the Hague Convention on Civil 
Aspects of Child Abduction in conjunction with its facilitating 
 
 72.  See David Sloss, Taming Madison’s Monster: How to Fix Self-Execution Doctrine, 
2015 BYU L. REV. 1691, 1708 (2016) (discussing Medellín and the one-step versus the two-
step analysis, both of which contain one step that is exclusively a domestic-law analysis). 
 73.  552 U.S. at 506–07. In addition, Medellín discusses the practices of other nations, 
although it does not explain precisely why this practice sheds light on what is ultimately an 
issue of U.S. domestic law. 
 74.  E.g., id. at 508, 510–11; see also id. at 515–16. 
 75.  John F. Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 655, 666–68 (2010) (discussing these three types of statutes). 
 76.  See Galbraith, supra note 2, at 89–104 (noting some early examples). 
 77.  See Coyle, supra note 75, at 681–85, 692–94 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of incorporative statutes in some cases in the 1980s and 1990s). 
 78.  560 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 79.  134 S. Ct. 1224 (2014). 
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legislation,80 and Bond v. United States,81 interpreting the legislation 
implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention. In these cases, the 
Court offers some signals on the interpretation of incorporative statutes, 
although these signals do not all line up perfectly with each other. 
Consistent with earlier Supreme Court practice, 82  Abbott, 
Lozano, and Bond all suggest that the meaning of the underlying 
treaties is important for the interpretation of the incorporative 
statutes. For Abbott and Lozano, this follows obviously from the text 
of the facilitating statute.83 Bond is more equivocal on this issue, and 
at one point the Court says, “[W]e have no need to interpret the 
scope of the Convention in this case.”84 Yet actions speak louder 
than words, for the Court spends a great deal of effort in describing 
and interpreting the Chemical Weapons Convention itself.85 As the 
Court puts it, the legislation “exists to implement the Convention, [and] 
so we begin with that international agreement.”86 In all three decisions, 
therefore, the interpretation of the underlying treaty is important.87 
 
 80.  In addition, the Court decided Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017 (2013), but that 
case is less significant than the other two with regard to treaty interpretation. There are 
differences between Abbott and Lozano in how they understand the relationship between the 
treaty and the legislation. In Abbott, the Court seems to treat the treaty as operative through 
the legislation but basically embodied in it, while in Lozano the Court takes care to indicate 
that the legislation expressly states that it is “in addition to and not in lieu of the provisions of 
the Convention.” 134 S. Ct. at 1233. These differences are perhaps due to the Court’s 
heightened sensitivities to these issues in deciding Lozano while Bond was pending. 
 81.  134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
 82.  Coyle, supra note 75, at 681–85. 
 83.  See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1229 (noting that the legislation “instructs courts to 
decide the case in accordance with the Convention”) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 84.  134 S. Ct. at 2088. 
 85.  See id. at 2083–85, 2087–88, 2093. The Court not only interprets the Convention 
as likely not covering the use of chemicals in the individual assault at issue, id. at 2087, but also 
interprets the Convention to allow implementation to be done through state rather than 
federal legislation. Id. at 2087, 2093. 
 86.  Id. at 2087. For a discussion of comparative practice in the United Kingdom on the 
interpretation of treaty-implementing statutes, see Michael Waibel, Principles of Treaty 
Interpretation: Developed for and Applied by National Courts? 13–14 (Univ. of Cambridge 
Faculty of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 16/2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2595681. 
 87.  It would further seem logical for the Court to interpret these underlying treaties in 
line with its general approach to treaty interpretation. In fact, there is considerable variation 
between Abbott, Lozano, and Bond in how they approach treaty interpretation and principles of 
deference. Regarding deference to the executive branch, for example, Abbott uses the “great 
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These decisions differ, however, in how they reconcile tensions 
between the underlying treaties and principles of U.S. domestic law. 
Abbott does not seem to implicate such tensions, but both Lozano 
and Bond do. In Lozano, the Court considered whether equitable 
tolling applied to the treaty and its facilitating legislation where (1) 
the United States has a presumption in statutory interpretation in 
favor of equitable tolling of a statute of limitations but (2) other 
parties to the treaty lack a similar presumption. 88  The Court 
emphasized that “[e]ven if a background principle is relevant to the 
interpretation of federal statutes, it has no proper role in the 
interpretation of treaties unless that principle is shared by the parties 
to an agreement among sovereign powers.”89 The Court accordingly 
interpreted the treaty not to require equitable tolling. It then went 
on to effectively hold that the facilitating legislation did not require 
tolling either.90 In Bond, by contrast, the Court held that “in this 
curious case” it was appropriate to apply a federalism canon to the 
interpretation of the implementing statute—even though, depending 
on the scope of the treaty, this might make the implementing 
legislation cover less conduct than was covered by the parallel 
language in the treaty.91 Notably, the Court made this novel move 
 
weight” standard while Lozano and Bond say nothing about deference (and differ in their 
conclusions from the executive branch). Nonetheless, it seems likely that these differences are 
unrelated to the role played by the incorporative statutes. To the extent that the Court does 
give “great weight” to the executive branch on the interpretation of the treaty, the principle 
that the interpretation of the treaty is relevant for the interpretation of the incorporative statute 
will make the executive branch’s position of significance to the interpretation of the 
incorporative statute as well. 
 88.  See 134 S. Ct. at 1232–33. 
 89.  Id. at 1233. 
 90.  See id. The Court framed this discussion in terms of the facilitating statute not 
“altering our understanding of the treaty itself.” Id. For there to be no equitable tolling, 
however, the facilitating statute would also need to not provide for it implicitly, despite the 
background presumption in American law that equitable tolling is available. The Court thus 
effectively concluded that the facilitating statute did not impliedly allow for tolling. See id. 
(noting that this statute “does not address the availability of equitable tolling”). 
 91.  See 134 S. Ct. at 2090. For a critique of this approach, see Edward T. Swaine, 
Bond’s Breaches, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517, 1518 (2015) (noting that this approach 
raised the “risk of jeopardizing U.S. compliance with its international obligations, contrary 
to constitutional principles designed to reduce that risk”). David Moore, by contrast, 
suggests that U.S. federalism principles should be used even in interpreting treaties 
themselves. David H. Moore, Treaties and the Presumption Against Preemption, 2015 BYU 
L. REV. 1555, 1578–79 (2016). 
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against the backdrop conclusions that the treaty was “agnostic” 
about whether enforcement was done at the federal or state level and 
additionally that all U.S. states had laws to cover the conduct at issue.92 
Between them, Lozano and Bond demonstrate how tensions can be 
found even between cases decided in the same term by the Court. 
III. THE RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) AND TREATY INTERPRETATION 
Now the Restatement rides again—but on different terrain from 
its predecessors. So what should the Restatement (Fourth) do about 
treaty interpretation? The most important change I recommend is 
heavier reliance on Articles 31 and 32. In addition, ideally the 
Restatement (Fourth) should make some tweaks to the Restatement 
(Third)’s approach to deference and address the interpretation of 
implementing legislation.93 
A. Articles 31 and 32 as Black Letter 
In the last thirty years, Articles 31 and 32 have become a 
cornerstone of international treaty practice and have been read 
broadly enough to leave treaty interpreters with considerable 
discretion. Instead of tracking the Restatement (Third)’s half-hearted 
endorsement, the Restatement (Fourth) should fully embrace these 
articles. The full text of Articles 31 and 32 should appear in the black 
letter of whatever provision replaces Section 325 of the Restatement 
(Third). Indeed, if it is compatible with the overall editorial choices, 
the black letter should ideally not only repeat the text of Articles 31 
and 32, but explicitly name these articles as the legal framework 
governing treaty interpretation. 
 
 92.  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087, 2092. 
 93.  This Article was drafted and circulated before the reporters of the Restatement 
(Fourth) circulated their draft provision on treaty interpretation. Although I thus will not 
comment in detail on this provision, I think it is an excellent one. Broadly speaking, the draft 
provision takes the approach that I advocate here with respect to Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention.  See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 106 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015) 
(incorporating almost the entire text of Articles 31 and 32 into the black-letter provision). The 
draft provision also takes an approach similar to the one that I advocate with respect to 
deference, providing in the black letter that U.S. courts “will ordinarily give great weight to an 
interpretation by the executive branch.” Id.; see also infra Section III.B (advocating the use of 
“will typically give great weight”). 
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This approach would have considerable benefits. As discussed 
earlier, the principles of treaty interpretation applied by the Supreme 
Court are essentially those of the Vienna Convention, particularly 
since the Convention is taken to be a “quite loose structure . . . 
rather than a straightjacket.”94 By incorporating Articles 31 and 32, 
the Restatement (Fourth) would accurately set forth what is not only 
customary international law on treaty interpretation, but also 
explicitly recognized by the United States to be so.  
Incorporating Articles 31 and 32 would also provide a set of 
principles that are not only clear and simple, but also better than 
other options. One such other option might be simply to set forth 
some language about treaty interpretation used by the Supreme 
Court. But this would immediately raise the question of which 
language, as the Court uses different phrases in different cases 
without signaling that it has a single, carefully thought-out formula. 
(Indeed, one phrase on treaty interpretation offered by the Court is 
already the language of Article 31(1), as set forth in the Restatement 
(Third)).95 Rather than privileging the choice of language made in 
some particular Supreme Court cases over other cases, the 
Restatement (Fourth) would do better to use the internationally 
accepted rules on treaty interpretation. 
Setting forth the full text of Articles 31 and 32 is also better than 
picking and choosing. Regardless of whether it was a good choice at 
the time for the Restatement (Third) to set forth only part of Article 
31, rewrite another part of Article 31, and take up all other issues in 
an ambivalent set of comments and reporters’ notes, it would be a 
poor one today. International practice has come to read the rules in 
Articles 31 and 32 broadly enough that there is no particular need to 
rewrite them for U.S. courts. For example, the International Law 
Commission’s developing recognition that subsequent practice of a 
single state can be a supplementary form of treaty interpretation 
under Article 32 mostly addresses the concern that the authors of 
the Restatement (Third) had with how the Vienna Convention 
approached subsequent practice.96 By giving the rules in full, the 
Restatement (Fourth) would accurately reflect customary international 
 
 94.  Gardiner, supra note 33, at 492. 
 95.  Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006). 
 96.  See supra notes 31, 45 and accompanying text. 
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law and also avoid the difficulties of having to determine and justify 
which aspects of the rules are most important in practice. 
Although Articles 31 and 32 are long, their full inclusion makes 
particular sense because of how important the issue of treaty 
interpretation is. Unlike many other issues related to treaties, treaty 
interpretation comes up in almost every case involving a treaty. 
Articles 31 and 32 accordingly get used by courts far more than 
most other provisions of the Convention.97 Of course, to say they 
get used is not to say that they have a powerful effect in channeling 
actual treaty interpretation. Indeed, the broadening understanding 
of their meaning may reflect the fact that the Vienna Convention 
“governs in part by not governing—or, put more precisely, achieves 
widespread compliance partly by deliberately declining to prioritize 
effectiveness.”98 Yet widespread acceptance of Articles 31 and 32 has 
the advantage of focusing the attention of interpreters on the act of 
interpretation rather than on its meta-principles. Their inclusion in 
the black letter of the Restatement (Fourth) would also be a valuable 
affirmation of the importance that international legal principles 
should have to U.S. courts in interpreting international law. 
My suggestions for the comments and reporters’ notes follow 
straightforwardly from my earlier analysis. I think these should (a) 
note that Articles 31 and 32 as interpreted are expansive enough to 
cover how U.S. courts approach treaty-making, (b) note that Articles 
31 and 32 now reflect customary international law, (c) pragmatically 
recognize that Articles 31 and 32 set forth the appropriate rules of 
decision for U.S. courts while leaving vague exactly why this is the 
case (in order to dodge the broader debate of the role of customary 
international law in U.S. law), (d) briefly acknowledge that U.S. 
courts can further take into account specific evidence from the U.S. 
negotiating process or the advice-and-consent process, (e) note that 
U.S. courts may pay special attention to foreign courts both as 
sources of subsequent practice and as actors whose views are worthy 
 
 97.  For example, my search of federal court decisions on Westlaw between 2009 and 
2014 revealed that Articles 31 or 32 are cited in at least eight of the twenty-five cases in which 
at least one judge references the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. At least four of 
these eight cases cite to Article 32. 
 98.  Jean Galbraith, Book Review, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 859, 861 (2014) (reviewing THE 
OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES, supra note 33). 
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of respectful consideration, and (f) state that the issue of treaty self-
execution is sufficiently distinct from overall treaty interpretation that 
it is covered elsewhere. A section along these lines would be of great 
value in clarifying the foreign relations law of treaty interpretation. 
B. Difficult Choices on Deference 
A much harder question is how the Restatement (Fourth) should 
characterize the issue of deference by U.S. courts to the executive 
branch. Should it follow Restatement (Third)’s approach of stating in 
the black letter that courts “will give great weight” and then qualifying 
this though discussion of case law in the reporters’ notes? Or should it 
soften the black letter—for example, “will typically give great weight”—
in addition to discussing case law in the reporters’ notes? 
I think either of these approaches could effectively describe the 
Supreme Court’s existing practice. From a descriptive perspective, 
the important thing is to communicate that the Court usually (but 
not always) says that it gives “great weight” to the views of the 
executive branch and yet sometimes decides cases in ways that seem 
inconsistent with substantial deference. In that sense, we may not be 
too far off from the frank observation in the Restatement (Second)’s 
preliminary draft that the “great weight” rule might in actuality be just 
“a symbol of professional courtesy between coordinate branches of 
government, or . . . a rationalization of conclusions reached on other 
grounds.”99 But this can be expressed either through softening the 
black letter or through building up the disclaimers that follow later. 
Nonetheless, for normative reasons I favor the approach of 
softening the black letter to something like “will typically give great 
weight.” I think “will give great weight” implies a duty to defer, 
while “will typically give great weight” implies a discretionary but 
generally wise exercise of deference. This difference speaks to a 
fundamental question of control—about whether courts defer to the 
executive branch out of a duty to show respect for presidential power 
in foreign affairs or instead out of a strong presumption that the 
executive branch has particular judgment and expertise in these 
matters. Where the interpretation of treaties is concerned—an area 
 
 99.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 4.08 cmt. f (AM. LAW. INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 1959). 
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where dubious interpretations by the executive branch could leave 
the United States in violation of legal obligations owed to other 
nations—I think it is better to characterize deference as a strong 
presumption rather than a duty.100 
C. The Interpretation of Incorporative Statutes 
A final issue is the interpretation of incorporative statutes. 
Because of the increased attention this issue has gotten in practice, it 
deserves some treatment in the Restatement (Fourth). It could 
conceivably be its own section, but because it is a still emerging 
issue, it seems to me that it would be best treated simply in a 
comment or in a reporters’ note accompanying the main provision 
on treaty interpretation. 
An incorporative statute should be interpreted in light of the 
underlying treaty (which itself will thus have to be interpreted). That 
is both evident from Supreme Court case law and intuitively correct. 
Less clear is how strong this interpretive canon is—and particularly 
how strong it is when it conflicts with canons of statutory 
construction in U.S. domestic law. Professor Coyle suggests that 
“the court should read the incorporative statute to conform to the” 
treaty as interpreted, “unless there is compelling evidence that 
Congress intended a different result.”101 This rule strikes me as 
eminently sensible and consistent with the implicit approach of 
Lozano and some earlier Supreme Court cases. But Bond takes a 
different tack and accepts that U.S. federalism principles could justify 
a gap between the interpretation of an incorporative statute and its 
similarly-worded underlying treaty. It remains for future practice to 
clarify whether Bond is a trendsetter or an outlier. Until then, the 
best thing for the Restatement (Fourth) to do might be just to state 
the obvious and note that courts can take different approaches in 
interpreting incorporative statutes when there is a tension between 
the interpretation of the treaty under international law and the usual 
canons of statutory construction under domestic law. 
 
 100.  For another discussion of this question, see Cohen, supra note 66, at 1487– 92. 
 101.  Coyle, supra note 75, at 680. 
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CONCLUSION 
Reflecting on the drafting of the Restatement (Third), Associate 
Reporter Detlav Vagts described how the reporters would first meet 
to “thrash [a draft] out with a certain amount of blood shed on the 
floor, usually at the Columbia Law School.”102 They would then go 
to the Advisers and have it be “picked over, carefully and in detail,” 
then take it to the Council and have to “pick ourselves off the floor 
after that,” and then take it to the ALI membership where “the floor 
is somewhat of a bottleneck.”103 
Overall, the Restatement drafting process almost rivals the 
complexity of multilateral treaty negotiations. And in Articles 31 and 
32 of the Vienna Convention, we have already the product of an 
exhaustive multilateral treaty negotiation—a product, moreover, that 
has clearly weathered the test of time. Given the broad international 
acceptance of these articles and their compatibility with the practice 
of treaty interpretation in U.S. courts, their incorporation into the 
black letter of the Restatement (Fourth) would be wise and might 
even be unusually easy to do. Although less important, a softening of 
the deference standard set out in the Restatement (Third) and some 
discussion of incorporative statutes would also be valuable. I hope 
the process will follow this course. 
 
 
 102.  The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Revised: How Were 
the Controversies Resolved?, supra note 1, at 183 (remarks of Detlev Vagts). 
 103.  Id. 
